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· The Honorable Richard S. Arnold was appointed by 
President Carter in October 1978 to the District Bench for the 
Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas and elevated to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1980, 
where he serves with his brother, the Honorable Morris S. 
Arnold. Judge Richard Arnold served as Chief Judge of the 
Eighth Circuit from January 8, 1992 to April 17, 1998. A 
graduate of Yale College and Harvard Law School, Judge 
Arnold clerked for Justice William Brennan of the United States 
Supreme Court from 1960-1961. He was an associate at 
Covington & Burling in Washington D.C. from 1961-1964, 
when he returned to Texarkana, Arkansas to practice law with 
the firm of Arnold & Arnold. In commemoration of his 
distinguished service as Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, 
colleagues and friends have authored the following short 
tributes. 
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PASCO M. BOWMAN II* 
Having served for more than fifteen years with Judge 
Richard Sheppard Arnold, I feel qualified to write a few words 
about him. He is a truly remarkable and impressive person. I 
consider it a great privilege to serve with him on the same 
federal court of appeals. 
At the time of my appointment to the court, Judge Arnold 
was one of the first of my new colleagues to call and say 
congratulations. He made it clear he had checked me out with 
his sources and the word he had gotten back was that I was a 
good guy, or something to that effect. I replied that I was glad to 
have passed muster, but that even if I had not, he was stuck with 
me anyway. We laughed, and our relationship was off to a good 
beginning. In all the ensuing years, it has never deviated from 
that good beginning. He is a highly valued colleague and has 
become a cherished friend. 
Our court is notable for its collegiality, its lack of rancor, 
for the true feeling of warmth and friendship among its 
members. Part of the credit for that must go to Judge Arnold, 
particularly during the time of his service as our chief judge. His 
tact, courtesy, good judgment, and respect for others, as well as 
his unflagging attention to the business of judicial 
administration, have set the standard for all of his successors as 
chief judge. 
Since his appointment to the court of appeals in 1980, 
Judge A mold has become one of the undisputed leaders of the 
federal judiciary. His service as chairman of the Budget 
Committee of the United States Judicial Conference was 
exemplary. It is not too much to say that he amazed observers 
with his encyclopedic knowledge of the judiciary's budget, or 
that he deeply impressed them by the capable way in which he 
presented the annual budget request to Congress. He similarly 
distinguished himself in his service as a member of the 
* Chief Judge Bowman has served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit since 1983, and as chief judge since April 1998. Prior to his appointment to the 
bench, Chief Judge Bowman was Professor of Law and Dean at the School of Law at the 
University of Missouri in Kansas City. 
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Executive Committee of the conference. To paraphrase the boast 
of a certain brokerage firm, when Judge Arnold speaks, people 
listen. 
Judge Arnold is a brilliant and accomplished person. He 
was first in his undergraduate class at Yale and first in his law 
school class at Harvard. He clerked for Justice Brennan at the 
Supreme Court. He successfully practiced law, first with a large 
firm in Washington, D.C., and then with his family's firm in 
Texarkana. Under the tutelage of Senator Dale Bumpers, he 
learned the political ropes in Washington as a member of the 
senator's staff. Eventually, he ran for Congress but lost in the · 
Democratic primary. In retrospect, we can view his loss as a 
fortunate one. Had he won a seat in Congress, a judgeship might 
never have beckoned. As things turned out, in 1978 President 
Carter appointed him to the district court and the rest is history. 
Congress's loss was definitely the judiciary's gain. 
Judge Arnold has many traits that I greatly admire. Among 
them is clarity of thought and of expression. His ideas are 
always well formed, and he knows how to communicate them in 
a simple and economical fashion. Though steeped in the classics 
and in classical languages, in his writings and his speech he 
eschews Latin phrases in favor of plain, easily understood 
English ( except when bantering in Latin with his younger 
brother, Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold). His clear, uncluttered 
style augments the quality of his thought, giving added force and 
persuasiveness to his ideas. 
I also greatly admire Judge Arnold's courage in standing up 
for his principles. He is not one to trim his views about what the 
law or the constitution requires in the cases on which he sits. He 
is not often a lonely dissenter, but when he believes the court is 
in error, he does not shrink from stating his views separately, or 
from supporting a petition for rehearing en bane if he thinks the 
issue is important enough. He always goes where the law and 
the facts take him, whether or not the destination is a popular 
one. 
Judge Arnold has demonstrated another kind of courage-
the courage to look into the face of severe adversity and to stare 
it down. Confronted several years ago by a serious illness, he 
underwent a series of unpleasant and debilitating treatments, and 
he prevailed. He dealt with the illness stoically, gracefully, and 
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even with a measure of good cheer, all the while maintaining his 
heavy work schedule and being extraordinarily productive. I am 
sure his strong religious faith, as well as the support of his wife 
Kay and the other members of his family, helped to sustain him 
throughout this difficult time. We rejoice that he has been 
restored to good health. 
Another trait I greatly admire is Judge Arnold's unfailing 
courtesy to everyone with whom he comes in contact. His 
respect for individuals knows no bounds, extending from 
presidents, members of Congress, and justices of the Supreme 
Court to the beggar we used to pass almost every morning as we 
walked to the courthouse in St. Louis. Judge Arnold knew the 
man's name, always spoke kindly to him, and always put 
something into his cup. He can be firm when the situation calls 
for firmness, but his firmness never takes the form of an attack 
on another person's dignity. In all the years I have known Judge 
Arnold, I never have heard him utter an unkind word to anyone. 
Where to stop? I do want to point out that Judge Arnold is a 
convivial dinner companion. He also is an excellent golfer. Like 
his opinions, his shots are crisp and on target. Like his approach 
to the law, his swing is a model of consistency. And no matter 
what the situation, his demeanor on the golf course is just as it is 
elsewhere: unflappable. 
Finally, I would comment that Judge Arnold is committed 
to the institutional well being of the federal judiciary and to 
keeping the rule of law alive and well. His tireless work on the 
budget committee and the executive committee of the judicial 
conference illustrates that commitment, as does his service as 
our court's chief judge. That commitment is accompanied by a 
generous spirit toward his colleagues, as witnessed by his 
stepping down last April, almost a year early, to give me an 
opportunity to serve as chief judge before I reached the age at 
which, taking up a chief judgeship is barred. I am grateful to 
Judge Arnold for his generosity and his confidence in me. He 
believes it is good for our court that more of its members have a 
tum as chief judge, and I agree with him, for I am learning that 
the insights and understanding gained from the experience are 
quite valuable. 
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To sum up, Judge Arnold is a great judge, a delightful 
colleague, and a wonderful human being. We are fortunate to 
know him and to have him in our midst. 
GILBERT S. MERRITT* 
Richard Arnold's playing partners are in for a treat when 
his golf ball arrives at the green. He pulls out a 100-year-old 
putter with a worn, but finely polished, antique wood shaft. His 
grandfather, a lawyer in Texarkana, first putted with it at the 
turn of the century. Richard's father inherited it and played with 
it for many years. Now it is Richard's. No telling how many 
balls it has rolled into the cup. In Richard's steady hands, as 
another fifteen footer drops in, the old putter seems like a magic 
wand with a long memory for how a golf ball will run and break. 
But I do not intend to dwell on Richard's golf game. The old 
putter is not only lovingly connected with Richard's family. It is 
symbolic of a life and mind rooted in history, with an uncanny 
memory for people, events and literature, legal and otherwise, and 
with a sense of balance and moderation based on the Golden Mean 
and a deep understanding of history. 1 When Richard works, or 
talks or writes, the ball always seems to drop in the cup. 
* Judge Menitt has been a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
since 1977, served as Chief Judge from 1989-96, and served as a member and as a Chairman of 
the Executive Committee of the United States Judicial Conference. Prior to his appointment to 
the bench, he practiced law in Nashville, Tennessee, and was a member of the faculty at 
Vanderbilt University Law School. 
I. In a fascinating lecture last year at NYU on the problem of constitutional interpretation, 
as seen through the eyes of James Madison, magnified through the lens of Richard Arnold, 
Richard has this to say about his own love for history: 
The question of the relevance of Madison's views is one you will have to answer 
for yourselves. My own view is that history is important because it's intrinsically 
interesting, or, to put it in plain language, history is fun. It may also be of some 
use in the work we have to do in our own time. 
Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 
269 (1997), an article that those interested in constitutional history should read as soon as 
possible. 
192 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS 
Richard majored in the classics at Yale and retains to this 
day his talent for Latin and Greek. A deeply spiritual man, his 
Biblical learning, like his legal learning and his historical 
understanding, is a product of a remarkable capacity to combine 
careful, precise analysis with the ability to synthesize diverse 
knowledge. It was no accident that in scholarship he ranked first 
in our class at Yale and at Harvard Law School. 
His great love for language (he learned Italian in later life by 
reading the Divine Comedy) has given Richard a poetic writing 
style-plain, spare, elegant. He recently rebutted the view that 
Justice Brennan, for whom he clerked in 1960, molded the Warren 
Court through sheer force of personality and "Irish guile." In five 
expressive sentences he catches the essence of Justice Brennan's 
role on the Court: 
Personality, no doubt, is important. Judges are human 
beings. They live in bodies and react on a personal level. 
But judges do not cast votes simply because their backs are 
slapped in a particularly engaging way. What Justice 
Brennan did, he did as a lawyer and as a judge, and his 
mastery of the English language, of the history of the 
Constitution, and of the technical aspects of the law played 
at least as big a part in his success at constructing 
majorities as the warmth of his personality and manner. 2 
This simple, clear, concise passage expresses a complex idea 
with a cadence of iambic pentameter typical of Richard's writing. 
I knew that there was something very special about Richard 
45 years ago, not long after we sat down next to each other at 
8:00 A.M. on September 22, 1953, for our first class as 
freshmen at Yale College. It was a class in beginning French 
taught five days a week in a little classroom above Yale's main 
Gothic gate, looking out over the New Haven green. When we 
struck up a short conversation before class began that morning, I 
was relieved. I thought, "This boy from Arkansas is probably 
just as unsophisticated and unprepared for Yale as am I, a farm 
boy from Tennessee." That idea did not last long. Within two 
weeks, he and Monsieur Tofoya, our teacher, were conversing 
back and forth in French. Within a month, Monsieur Tofoya had 
2. Richard S. Arnold, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 5 
(1997). 
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put him up in French 20, which required as preparation two 
good years of high school French. Before the first semester was 
out, the French Department put Richard into French 30, an 
advanced class, where they read Beaudelaire, Stendhal and other 
great French writers. 
But I do not want to dwell on how smart Richard Arnold is. 
Articles like this one tend to overemphasize a judge's 
intelligence and learning to the exclusion of qualities of the heart 
like a sense of justice, diplomacy, thoughtfulness, humor, 
loyalty, tolerance and affection for others. There are many smart 
people, but only one with the complex mind and spirit of 
Richard Arnold. It is his heart and character that make all who 
know him love and admire him. 
For his many friends and acquaintances, Richard is a hero 
and a model-on the one hand, highly competitive, with a great 
capacity for work and achievement, while at the same time, 
blessed with an enlarged capacity for sympathy and the ability to 
put himself into the shoes of another. Even though pressed for 
time, he cannot pass a beggar by or allow a genuine request for 
aid to go unanswered. One such time I said, "Richard, the guy is 
probably an alcoholic or a dope addict." 
He responded in good humor, "You never know, he may 
be an angel." In his mind, the guy is just one of God's children 
in need. 
Richard summons what little anger and hostility his nature 
owns in the face of the bully who takes advantage of the weakness 
of others. He is instinctively for the underdog and for the liberty 
and dignity of the little guy. That sentiment runs subtly throughout 
his opinions, writings and speeches.3 His legal and moral 
philosophy emphasizes the importance of the claims of the less-
3. For example, his Howard Kaplan Memorial Lecture at Hofstra Law School on the 
sanctity of trial by jury is a sennon about his faith in the deliberations of "twelve ordinary 
people," for whom the expert is no "match." Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The 
Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. I, 3 (1993). In 
this same lecture Richard gives us his thoughts on the relation of reason and emotion in the 
deliberative process: 
And here is the thing I want to tell you-the point: emotion is not a bad thing. In 
law or anywhere else, we do not often think of it that way, perhaps. We say that 
the life of the law is reason, but there is more to it than cold rationalism. As 
Pascal said, "The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know." 
Id. at 35. But he ends with the qualification, "so long as your feelings and your emotions can 
be tested by reason." Id 
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favored class. Achilles' pitiless enforcers, the myrmidons of the 
law, are not Richard's friends. He takes basic Christian ethics 
seriously, reflecting the ancient admonition found in Matthew 
25:40: "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these my 
brethren, ye have done it unto me." Or as his charming and 
insightful wife, Kay, said to me once in more modem English: "I 
was lucky enough to marry the man who is always the last to 
judge and the first to forgive." 
MORRISS. ARNOLD* 
My brother Arnold's distinguished career is too well known 
to most readers of this journal to make a rehearsal of it here 
worthwhile. Those who require or desire a primer on it, and a 
survey of some of my brother's more notable opinions, may 
consult the contributions noted in the margin. 1 What I want to 
write briefly about for present purposes has to do with some 
early influences on his life and thinking that have, I believe, left 
discernible traces in his jurisprudence, if only one looks at it 
with a trained and educated eye. 
My brother, as everyone knows, possesses a legendary 
intelligence; indeed, his colleagues sometimes admiringly 
remark to me on how easy the analysis and solution of legal 
puzzles is for him. More importantly, my brother is an 
intellectual. There are lots of differences between being 
intelligent and being intellectual (there are many brilliant 
* Judge Morris Shepard Arnold has served with his brother, Richard S. Arnold, on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit since 1992. Prior to his appointment 
to the Eighth Circuit, Judge Arnold served on the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Arkansas for six years. 
I. Especially useful for this enterprise are the following: William J. Brennan, Jr., A 
Tribute to Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1993); John P. Frank and 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Brief Biography of Judge Richard S. Arnold, 78 MINN. L. 
REV. 5 (1993); Donald P. Lay, My Colleague-Richard S. Arnold, 78 MINN. L. REV. 25 
( 1993); and Patricia M. Wald, Judge Arnold and Individual Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 35 
( 1993). 
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people, for instance, who don't give a fig for ideas), but in this 
context I use the word "intellectual" to mean someone who 
believes in the practical consequence of political, philosophical, 
and legal principles, and in their capacity to produce morally 
reliable and systematic results. Such people, of course, are very 
interested in learning, and are consumed with a desire to acquire 
it. A relevant anecdote will serve to illustrate early signs of my 
brother's intellectualism rather nicely. When he was a first-year 
law student at Harvard, I remember telling him that the 
University of Arkansas had been ranked number 7 in the most 
recent polls. "Oh?" he replied, with considerable interest. 
"Which department? Latin? History?" I am not kidding-and 
neither was he. 
The notion that legal problems can be puzzled out, that the 
mind can solve them by the application of principle, has a 
distinctly Whiggish cast to it, and it is here that early influences 
on my brother's modes of thinking may be showing themselves. 
Ideas and learning were extremely important around our house 
when we were growing up. One of my early memories is sitting 
around in our library listening to my sixteen-year-old brother 
teach our mother ancient Greek. (I wonder if there was anyone 
else in Miller County, Arkansas, doing that that day?) Our 
mother wanted to know just about all there was to know, and 
had an opinion on every subject, which she did not scruple to 
share with her sons. Her·father had been a United States Senator, 
but despite (because of?) the fact that he had been a big New 
Dealer, Progressive, and Prohibitionist, she was highly skeptical 
of government (especially the federal government), and believed 
that it ought to be very jealously restrained. 
Our father once told a newspaper that my mother was the 
most conservative person whom he had ever known (high praise, 
indeed, considering the source), but that is a highly partial 
appreciation of her. What our father was referring to was my 
mother's deep suspicion of government and her respect for a 
spontaneous order that gave wide range to individual effort. But 
Judge Henry Woods of Little Rock (not a political conservative) 
once described my . mother to me as someone who was 
"involved in every righteous cause." I remember some of those 
causes: she supported the NAACP in the 'forties, wrote poems 
damning the KKK that were published in the local newspaper, 
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and threatened KKK members to their fal:e that she would alert 
the FBI to any illegal activities that they might undertake. When 
she died, the Texarkana Gazette's editor opined that she was the 
most democratic person whom he had ever met. In other words, 
she was a person of liberality and tolerance, and tried to teach 
her sons to be the same. 
The characteristics of my mother that I have described are 
not disparate, antagonistic aspects of a single personality, as 
some would think, but rather manifestations of a single, simple 
principle which she tenaciously adhered to. That principle was 
freedom and responsibility for all, without respect to race, color, 
or creed. Such a political philosophy used to be called 
liberalism, but that word has a decidedly different odor about it 
today because it comes freighted with a large dose of statism. 
Nowadays, we call that philosophy libertarianism. 
When one adds to all this the fact that our father was 
general counsel for a large public utility, and thus spent a great 
part of his life battling the rural electrical cooperatives in court, 
it is not hard to see that my brother grew up in a distinctly 
Whiggish environment. I want to suggest that this was one 
influence that produced the profound respect, even reverence, 
for the bill of rights that his opinions frequently exhibit. 
Two quick examples from my brother's opinions will 
suffice to demonstrate what I am talking about. The twin 
ordering principles of libertarian philosophical thought are 
property and contract (indeed, if there were space enough, it 
would be easy to demonstrate that these principles are, at 
bottom, but one). In a case that affirmed the denial of a motion 
to suppress evidence,2 my brother observed in dissent that the 
"liberty of the citizen [was] seriously threatened" by certain 
police practices, and that "[t]he sanctity of private property, a 
precious human right [was] endangered" by them.3 (In one or 
two sentences, this opinion exposes to view the sophomoric 
character of jurisprudential attempts to differentiate privacy 
rights from property rights: The essence of both is the right to 
exclude.) Five years later, my brother, again in dissent, was 
moved to remark that the Contracts Clause of the constitution 
2. United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992). 
3. Id. at 397. 
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"is designed to safeguard a basic human right, the right to make 
private contracts." 4 If these two cases, which recognize property 
and contract as precious and basic human rights, do not expose 
to view a fundamental libertarianism at work, then I do not 
know how properly to characterize them. 
Is not this high regard for individual rights and private 
ordering the best way to comprehend my brother's controversial 
ruling in United States Jaycees v. McClure?5 In that case, he 
held that the Minnesota legislature's attempt to force the Jaycees 
to take women as members violated the Jaycees' rights to 
association and was thus unconstitutional. In the course of his 
opinion, my brother hinted, and hinted strongly, that he had no 
sympathy for the Jaycees' position, but concluded that the 
Minnesota statute violated the constitution because "the right to 
choose with whom one will be associated necessarily implies, 
within some limits, the right also to choose with whom one will 
not associate." 6 
Judge Patricia M. Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit 
has affected (as a rhetorical device, I suspect) to find this 
opinion "most enigmatic," especially in the context of my 
brother's intense insistence on protecting women's rights in 
other cases. 7 He had, for instance, as a district judge, in what 
Judge Wald quite correctly describes as "an exotic gender 
discrimination case about girls' basketball rules," 8 struck down 
a state regulation that forced girls to play "half-court" 
basketball.9 But if one sees both the Jaycees' case and the 
basketball case as manifestations of a healthy regard for 
individual liberty, their results are easily reconciled: They argue 
for constitutional protection of individual rights, whether the 
government is telling girls how to play basketball or telling men 
whom they must admit to their clubs. The Jaycees' case, in other 
words, is nothing more than a reprise on those cases in which 
4. Honeywell, Inc. v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 110 F.3d 547, 562 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied,_ U.S._, 118 S. Ct. 156 (1997). 
5. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. 
Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
6. Id. at 1576 (emphasis in original). 
7. See Wald, supra note 1, at 53. 
8. Id. at 49. 
9. See Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Assoc., 468 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1979). 
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my brother expressed his admiration for the principles of 
contract and property. What the Jaycees had agreed (contracted) 
to do was to exclude someone (the essence of property/privacy). 
Viewed in this light, there is nothing whatever "enigmatic" 
about the holding in this case. 
No one, certainly no judge worth his or her salt, is so 
simple-minded that the essence of his or her jurisprudence can 
be captured by a single word. In addition to being deeply 
informed by classical liberal principles, my brother's opinions 
are shaped by, among other things, a highly practical sense of 
how the world works and the proper role of appellate judges. 
What I mean to suggest in this tentative look at a very select few 
of my brother's numerous, varied opinions, is simply that a way 
of understanding some of them is that he believes that the 
constitution, in its bill of rights and elsewhere, contains robust 
guarantees of individualism, not puny ones, and that this attitude 
may well have been forged rather early on in his life. Other 
examples of this mindset at work might no doubt be usefully 
multiplied and dissected, but I shall leave that to others and to 
another day. 
PHILIP HEYMANN* 
When Richard Arnold and I worked in the same office at 
the Harvard Law Review as the two "case editors" before we 
graduated in 1960, his character was already powerful and in 
many ways, unique. 
Obviously, he came to the second year of law school with 
an imposing reputation, not only because he was first in our law 
school class, but also because he had enjoyed similar 
distinctions at Yale College and before. Still, he was younger 
than many of us, at a stage in life when that could be a 
* Philip Heymann is the James Barr Ames Professor at the Harvard University Law 
School. 
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disadvantage in argument, and his views of the law were far 
more grounded in precedent and history than most of the rest of 
us, who considered ourselves policy makers and legal realists. 
We sometimes thought of him as a brilliant anachronism, but if 
we tried to hammer that home in debate we were quite likely to 
have our arguments met and more than matched with surprising 
ease by Richard. 
What was most striking then was that, although he liked to 
argue, he had no desire to dominate; that he believed more 
deeply than most of us in the law as an institution with its own 
rules; and that he was absolutely committed to intellectual as 
well as personal honesty. Even those who found his views too 
conservative would trust him to respond to their arguments 
openly, honestly, and respectfully. 
Two other traits were already there although they would 
grow as the years went on. He had a sense of humor about 
himself, based in a deep sense of humanity and fallibility that 
has made him a great human being. And he had a sense of 
fairness to all that now shines through his opinions. 
I was and am very lucky indeed to have Judge Arnold as a 
friend. 
PRICE MARSHALL* 
And thou shalt teach them ordinances and laws, and 
shalt shew them the way wherein they must walk, 
and the work that they must do. 
Inscription on the front of Austin Hall at the 
Harvard Law School, quoting Exodus 18:20. 
* Price Marshall practices law with the Jonesboro, Arkansas law office of Barrett & 
Deacon, P.A. He served as a law clerk to the Honorable Richard S. Arnold from I 989-
1991. Mr. Marshall also has the distinction of being the first subscriber to The Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process. 
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It started with bow ties. One day at lunch, when I was 
attending Arkansas State University, I saw a lawyer friend at a 
restaurant. For some reason I was dressed up in a suit and a bow 
tie. 
"You look like Richard Arnold," he said. 
"Who," I asked, "is Richard Arnold?" 
Several years later I was in law school, and I kept hearing 
about him. "Don't worry about trying to write a perfect exam," 
my civil procedure professor told my class. "It's already been 
done, but only once." And then my professor told us about a 
former student, now a federal judge in Arkansas, named Richard 
Sheppard Arnold. He wrote his civil procedure exam in a neat, 
printed handwriting that looked like typing between the lines of 
the paper. He cited every case by its complete name and correct 
citation. He addressed every issue thoughtfully and thoroughly. 
"Perfect," my professor said. "You won't be able to match 
that." We dido' t. 
I therefore knew it was blind luck when I got invited to 
Little Rock the next year to interview with Judge Arnold for a 
clerkship. I went to his house on a beautiful Saturday afternoon. 
Kay, his wife, met me at the door. "I'll tell the Judge you're 
here," she said and offered me a seat. With the edginess of an 
interviewee, I latched onto Kay's words and sat wondering: 
what kind of man was called "the Judge" by his wife? 
"The Judge" and I talked for an hour-about Arkansas, 
politics, his brother, and London. The law came up a time or 
two. His words revealed a gentle spirit, a thoughtful nature, and 
an amazing mind. But I left perplexed because we had more of a 
conversation than an interview. Later I learned why. It wasn't an 
interview. Judge Arnold is from the old school on clerkships, 
and he trusts and relies on the recommendations of a few close 
friends. I was only there to take what the Judge calls "the crazy 
test": as long as the applicant is not crazy, he gets the job. 
I passed. From August 1989 until August 1991 I served as 
one of Judge Arnold's law clerks. It was the best job I've ever 
had. 
* * * 
RSA involved his clerks in each step of his work. My co-
clerks and I divided and studied the briefs in the cases the Judge 
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was scheduled to hear. Then the three of us spent our afternoons 
circled around the Judge's desk, giving him what one of our 
predecessors called "book reports" on the cases. All the while 
RSA taught us the law under the pretense that we were 
preparing him for oral arguments. 
One afternoon, a fellow clerk summarized an immigration 
case about a question of extradition. 
"Do they cite Ker v. Illinois?" the Judge asked. 
"No sir." 
The Judge got up, went to his set of United States Reports, 
and pulled down a volume. He opened the table of contents and 
said quietly to himself, "I thought the name was spelled with 
one 'r,' not two." Flipping to the case as he walked back, he 
said, again only to himself, "Oh, it was a typographical error." 
Handing the book to my co-clerk, the Judge explained the 
holding in Ker to us and why this decision from 1886 controlled 
the case he was about to hear. 1 That is RSA: gifted with an 
encyclopedic knowledge of the law, and rarer still, blessed with 
the patience to teach young lawyers. 
* * * 
The Judge taught us more than the law. Unfailingly 
courteous, he treated every person with respect. To him, 
manners revealed morals, and he always stopped his work to 
talk--with us, with his fellow judges, and with the folks who 
cleaned the chambers as we worked into the evening together. 
RSA showed us that work could wait, but people could not. 
The Judge also showed us how laughter leavens the day. 
One of my co-clerks kept a kangaroo doll (a souvenir from a trip 
to Australia) in her office. "Kanga" was always into mischief, 
and the Judge joined our antics. Once RSA got a telephone 
message from Kanga saying that she was in the Pulaski County 
Jail and needed his help. RSA responded with a note: "Call her 
back and tell her I am ethically forbidden to intervene." 
The Judge loved a good laugh, especially on himself. A 
frequent visitor to chambers was an elderly woman who long 
ago had been a client at the law firm of Arnold & Arnold in 
I. Compare 119 U.S. viii (table of contents listing Kerr v. Illinois), with Ker v. 
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
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Texarkana. She had known wealth, but had fallen on hard times 
and often wandered in her own world. The Judge spent many 
hours listening to her troubles. But even his patience had limits. 
Returning from a cruise around the Mediterranean with Kay, he 
summoned all the law clerks and his two secretaries into his 
office. The elderly former client had telephoned him-in 
Istanbul-and talked his ear off. The Judge wanted to know who 
had given her the phone number of his hotel. The culprit, he 
said, would be boiled in oil. All of us pleaded innocent, and we 
were excused. 
The next day, after the woman had come for a visit, the 
Judge called us all back in. He was laughing at himself. He was 
the culprit. Before he left he had told her about his trip and the 
stop in Istanbul. It had been easy to find him, she said, because 
there are only two good hotels in Istanbul and she knew he 
would be at one of them. The Judge apologized for doubting us, 
and we left him still laughing at himself. 
The flow of our work in chambers was steady, but usually 
not overwhelming. At times, however, the flood came. Judge 
Arnold's reaction was always the same: when there was more to 
do than we possibly could, he slowed his pace. I would be 
caught up the rush, moving too fast and making mistakes. But 
the Judge would pause for breath, and take the extra care that 
comes from moving deliberately. His calm reassured us; it was 
more important to do the job right, than to get it done on some 
particular schedule. 
Taking time for people, for laughter, and to do the job 
well. Only a great-souled man can keep such a balance when 
pressed by this world. And so the Judge showed us the way in 
which we should walk. 
* * * 
The Judge divided the cases that fell to him to write into 
three groups. Easy cases he wrote himself because he could do 
the work very quickly. Hard cases he wrote because they 
demanded it. And we clerks helped him write the opinions in the 
cases in the middle. The Judge would outline the court's 
reasoning, provide the architecture of the opinion, and then put 
one of us to work. We usually worked on one opinion at a time. 
His timetable for us never varied: "Work on it until you get it 
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exactly right." When we were done, the draft opinion went to 
his conference table with the briefs and the record. And after he 
revised it, and made it completely his own, he circulated the 
draft to the other judges on the panel. 
He expected our best in our work. When we let him down, 
he corrected us gently and reminded us to keep striving to do 
better. We lived for his comments on our draft opinions. They 
came in his small printed hand, in black ink, at the top right 
comer of the first page. An "excellent draft" could lift your 
spirits for days. A "very good job" always brought contentment. 
His comments, however, were not always sweetness and light; 
they were the truth. I recall a draft that I had hurried through. He 
kept my first sentence and rewrote the rest of the opinion 
himself. That was his comment. And I learned from it that high 
expectations are the best teacher. 
The Judge had some general rules for opinions. First, the 
facts had to be correct. No exceptions. So we studied trial 
records, checked facts, and double-checked each other's work-
all to be sure that every opinion kept faith with the record. 
Second, every opinion had to be understandable to the losing 
party-not only to his lawyer, but also to the litigant himself. 
The Judge insisted that his opinions rest on reasons and 
explanations, not case citations and conclusions. That seemed 
right to me then, but I did not really understand until I started 
practicing law; now I've lost cases, and had to explain why to 
clients, and I do. Third, the Judge's opinions had to be well 
written. He insisted that we learn the difference between "that" 
and "which," where "only" goes in a sentence, that "breach" is 
a noun and not a verb, and when to hyphenate phrasal 
adjectives. As RSA told us, it makes some difference whether 
you mean a purple people-eater, or a purple-people eater. 
Following the rules of grammar and usage made our thinking 
and our writing clearer. It also taught us the importance of being 
faithful in small things. 
The Judge is fond of Holmes's advice: the craftsman's task 
is "to hammer out as compact and solid a piece of work as one 
can, to try to make it first rate, and to leave it unadvertised." 2 
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Class of '61, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 94 
(Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). 
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Echoing Holmes in his example and his precepts, RSA showed 
us the work we must do. 
* * * 
Lawyers often comment on the bow ties I wear, and ask if I 
picked that up from Judge Arnold. I smile, say no, and leave it 
there. The truth is deeper. Bow ties are not his mark on me. But 
the little law I've ever really understood, the balance I seek in 
my life, and the habit of sticking to my work until the job is 
done as well I can do it-all these and more I owe to him. · 
RICHARD W. GARNETT* 
Judge Arnold has joked that his appointment to the bench 
was based on "merit"-" [his] merit was that [he] worked for a 
Senator."' Well, I'm not a judge; I was just a law clerk.2 But, 
like Judge Arnold, I got my job on "merit": My "merit," and 
the reason I had the privilege of clerking for Judge Richard,3 was 
that his brother, Judge Morris ("Buzz") Arnold, had the good 
sense to hire my wife. One brother did a favor for the other and, 
as a result, I was blessed with the chance to spend a year in 
Arkansas pilfering the Whitewater jurors' snacks, hiking in the 
Ozarks, and learning from Judge Richard. 4 
* Richard W. Garnett is an associate with Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin in Washington 
D.C. He served as one of Judge Arnold's law clerks during the 1995-1996 term. 
I. Richard S. Arnold, Trial By Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in 
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. I, I (1993). 
2. Just to be clear, law clerks are not judges. Some people these days appear to have 
lost sight of this fact. See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS (1998); Tony 
Mauro, Corps of clerks lacking in diversity, USA TODAY, March 13, 1998, at 12A. Judge 
Arnold has not, which is just one of the many reasons he is a good judge. 
3. I hope Judge Arnold knows that his extended "chambers family" often calls him 
(though not to his face) "Judge Richard," and his brother, "Judge Buzz." If not, I 
apologize for this "leak." In fact, this would not be the first time I've mistakenly spilled 
the beans to the Judge. I once inadvertently let slip in Judge Arnold's company the 
"secret" that, when he is out of town, his clerks wear jeans. 
4. Judge Arnold's own clerkship, with Justice Brennan, came about through more 
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I don't think it is news to anyone who knows anything 
about the law that Judge Richard Arnold is a great federal judge. 
He is very, very smart-one of the stories about him in 
Washington is that, when he left Covington & Burling, the 
associates had to start going back to the library5-and he is 
gracious, devout, and wise. He is precisely the sort of judge, and 
his decisions display just the kind of reasoned and thoughtful 
craftsmanship, that law reviews should be praising, law students 
studying, and lawyers emulating. I was honored to work for him 
and I am proud to know him. 
This is-no surprise-not the first time that Judge Arnold 
has been honored in the law reviews. A few years ago, the 
Minnesota Law Review published several tribute articles about 
the Judge, in part-or so it seems to me-to make the case that 
Judge Arnold belonged on the Supreme Court.6 (He does.) One 
of those articles contained a few nuggets about the life and work 
of a Judge Richard law clerk. 7 The piece was, for the most part, 
accurate. It is true that he decides cases for himself, he reads all 
the briefs, he dictates a lot of his own opinions, and he doesn't 
really need us. But, with all due respect to the article's 
distinguished authors, their account could use a little "filling 
out." 
For instance, it has been said that the Judge divides his 
cases into "three broad categories: If they are simple, he writes 
the opinions himself because they can be completed in a few 
minutes. If the case presents a difficult issue, he also writes the 
opinion himself because he is unsure what exactly to instruct the 
law clerk to do. The medium cases, he divides for first draft 
purposes among his four clerks." 8 I suppose this is how the 
Judge looks at it. But remember, he is an uncommonly smart 
person. And just so the taxpaying public knows that his law 
orthodox channels. See Richard S. Arnold, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 
HARV. L. REV. 5, 5 (1997) ("In those kinder and gentler days, one did not apply for the 
job; it was simply offered."). 
5. For example, Judge Arnold knew, off the top of his head, who was the only Pope 1n 
history to abdicate (Celestine V). 
6. William J. Brennan, Jr. et al., A Tribute to Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, 78 
MINN. L. REV. I (1993). 
7. John P. Frank & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Brief Biography of Judge Richard S. 
Arnold, 78 MINN. L. REV. 5, 11-12 (1993). 
8. Frank & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 11. 
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clerks try to earn their salaries, and on behalf of every Judge 
Richard clerk who has ever sweated over what certainly seemed 
to be a "difficult issue," I respectfully dissent from the "Judge 
Arnold keeps all the hard cases" theory. That said, it is true and 
as it should be that, as the Judge told us early in our clerkship 
year, "The clerks may draft a lot of the opinions, but I write all 
of them." 9 
For the law clerks, the high drama in the opinion-drafting 
process was when the Judge strolled across the hall to the clerks' 
offices with our re-worked first drafts. His meticulously printed 
edits would be scattered throughout the draft, along with re-
written sentences, requests for further research, questions, 
grammatical changes, stylistic flourishes, and, often, mysterious 
Latinisms. Most important for us, though, in the upper-right 
comer, there would usually be a few cryptic, printed syllables-
" O.K.," "Good," "First-rate job," or, in my case, "too long." 
(That the Judge keeps long-winded clerks in line is another 
reason, or illustration of, why he is such a good judge.)w I don't 
think I have been prouder in my short legal career than when the 
Judge returned my draft in what seemed to me to be a tricky tax 
case with "excellent" written at the top-right. 
The other Eighth Circuit clerks' introduction to the Judge 
usually comes in St. Louis, at an orientation held during the 
court's first fall sitting. I remember that we were to be drilled on 
the Sentencing Guidelines and other mysteries of federal 
practice. Judge Arnold began the session with a short talk on 
drafting opinions, and the talk was as Strunkian as his opinions. 11 
He asked us please not to use the phrase, "totality of the 
circumstances." That phrase, he thought, is turgid, ponderous, 
and over-wrought. "The circumstances" does the job just fine. 
Also, he urged, avoid referring to the principles announced in 
cases, or to the steps in a process of legal reasoning, as "tests" 
with "prongs." So, I spent a fair bit of time translating the 
Supreme Court's ever-increasing body of prong-law to "factors 
that guide our analysis" or" steps in our reasoning." 
9. He also told us, "The opinions are 50% yours and 100% mine." 
10. Frank & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 20 ("The typical Arnold opinion is short 
and never windy."). 
11. WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 23 (3d ed. 1979) 
("Omit needless words."). 
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The Judge also taught me and all the other clerks the value 
of judicial courtesy. He is unfailingly polite to the lawyers who 
argue before him;· even, frankly, when they step out of line. He 
is respectful and attentive even in the most drop-dead-boring 
cases. And, in every case argued by appointed counsel, he goes 
out of his way to thank the attorneys for their assistance-" We 
appreciate your taking this case. It is a big help to us." In fact, 
ever since I left my clerkship, I've been angling for an appointed 
case in the Eighth Circuit, just so I can hear the Judge say that to 
me. 
I sometimes joke that a job with Judge Arnold has the best 
intellectual-satisfaction-to-stress ratio of any legal job in the 
country. I suppose this· is why I have so many wonderful 
memories from my clerkship (without the horror stories that 
seem to go with the territory in other chambers): Waiting in line 
at a greasy, noisy, sweaty, and outstanding Little Rock barbecue 
joint, the Judge in seersucker, reading slip opinions; the Judge 
and his brother chiding each other in Latin over dinner in St. 
Louis; our chambers betting pools (not for money, of course) 
during the early 1996 primaries, and the Judge's hilariously poor 
predictions; 12 the daily trip to the jury room to scavenge a few 
doughnuts-chocolate for the clerks, plain glazed for the Judge; 
my co-clerk's efforts to convince the Judge that good coffee 
really is better than bad coffee; the Judge at his Christmas party 
proudly introducing his guests to the results of my (perfectly 
legal) home-brewing efforts as "Eighth Circuit brew"; and the 
sight of all his former clerks, his staff, his wife, and even the 
President ( on video), sporting bow ties at the party celebrating 
his 15th anniversary on the bench. 
Now, the Judge is a bit of an aristocrat, and a Southern 
Gentlemen, in the true and best sense of both those words, 13 so 
we law clerks were under no illusions that we were his 
12. The Judge actually predicted that Senator Gramm would win the New Hampshire 
primary. 
13. Frank & Higginbotham, Jr., supra note 7, at 5 ("Before Richard Arnold was 
born ... , the good fairies gathered and agreed to bestow upon him three gifts: a silver 
spoon for his mouth, an uncommon brilliance for his mind, and a profound sense of 
spirituality for his heart."). Professor Thomas Shaffer has written a variety of wonderful 
articles on the "Southern Gentleman Lawyer," which remind me of Judge Arnold. See, 
e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 181 
(1981). 
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"buddies." But it was precisely because he usually maintained 
just the right amount of dignified and professional distance from 
us that it was so much fun when, for whatever reason, the 
distance shrank. Because he didn't tell us everything he was 
thinking, we were able to enjoy sitting in our cramped offices 
across the hall from his, in Little Rock's relatively decrepit 
federal courthouse, wondering "what the Judge would think" 
about various things. 
* * * 
When Judge Arnold offered me a job, I have to admit that I 
knew little about him other than that he was viewed by many as 
a longtime acquaintance of President Clinton's and likely 
nominee to the United States Supreme Court. But soon after I 
learned that Judge Arnold was the judicial equivalent of 
papabile, my real introduction to him came when I read his short 
opinion dissenting from the en bane Eighth Circuit's denial of a 
motion for a stay of execution in Schlup v. Delo, 14 a death-
penalty case. 15 
Briefly, Lloyd Schlup insisted that he was "actually 
innocent" of murdering a fellow inmate in Missouri, and that his 
factual innocence constituted sufficient cause to permit the 
habeas court to review his otherwise-barred claim that his trial 
counsel had been ineffective. Judge Arnold's short opinion-it 
is only a few paragraphs long-is an excellent example of his 
judging. There is in the opinion no fiery rhetoric, no self-
righteousness, no indignant accusations, and no hand-wringing. 
Instead, the judge set out clearly and succinctly two legal 
questions that, in his view, were sufficiently "deserving of this 
Court's en bane time." 16 
14. 11 F.3d 738, 754 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C. J., dissenting from denial of 
suggestion for rehearing en vane and of motion for stay of execution), vacated, 513 U.S. 
298 (1995). 
15. On my first day at work, I inherited from my predecessor law clerk a list of 
"Arnold-isms," which included a warning regarding Judge Arnold's careful attention to 
the demands of the unit-modifier rule, citing one of his recent opinions, Reed v. Woodruff 
County, 7 F.3d 808, 809 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The report also stated that [the deceased] killed 
himself, apparently unintentionally, while engaged in auto-erotic asphyxiation."). Old 
habits die hard. 
16. Schlup, 11 F.3d at 755. 
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On the first point-whether the Sawyer v. Whitney 17 "no 
reasonable juror" standard or the Kuhlmann v. Wilson 18 "fair 
probability" standard applies when a habeas petitioner seeks to 
avoid a procedural default on grounds of factual innocence-
Judge Arnold candidly acknowledged that" [the] panel did what 
it had to do" in rejecting Schlup's claim, because it was bound 
by an earlier Eighth Circuit case interpreting Sawyer. 19 However, 
Judge Arnold believed that the earlier panel might have misread 
Sawyer, and that the full court should correct the earlier panel's 
mistake. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the question, and 
his doubts about the merits of the earlier panel's decision, it 
didn't appear to occur to Judge Arnold that the Schlup panel 
could or should have disregarded it. To some, this might seem 
an insignificant point; to me, though, it shows Judge Arnold's 
respect and commitment, even in hard cases, to the rule of law. 
Next, Judge Arnold noted that, in Herrera v. Collins,2° a 
majority of the Supreme Court Justices appeared to have 
recognized that compelling evidence of actual innocence might 
serve as a free-standing ground for habeas relief, and not simply 
as a "gateway" for review of otherwise barred claims.21 While 
maintaining a proper deference to the panel judges' view of the 
evidence in Schlup's case, Judge Arnold suggested that the case 
appeared to him a plausible occasion for invoking Herrera. The 
Judge recognized that en bane review by an appellate court is 
not generally the appropriate forum for deciding such "fact-
intensive question[s] .... But where human life is at stake, I 
believe that rehearing en bane is appropriate whenever a 
petitioner makes a substantial claim." 22 
As it turned out, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge 
Arnold.23 
I realize that Judge Arnold's little opinion in Schlup is not 
the usual grist for law-review tributes. And I recognize that the 
17. 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
18. 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
19. Schlup, 11 F.3d at 755. 
20. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
21. Schlup, 11 F.3d at 755. 
22. Id. 
23. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Judge Arnold appears to have better luck in 
the Supreme Court when he is dissenting than when he writes the majority opinion. See 
irifra. 
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Schlup case was far more complicated than the above few 
paragraphs might suggest. In my view, though, the Judge's short 
dissent showed clearly what good judging should look like. In 
fact, I thought of that opinion when I read Judge Arnold's recent 
tribute to Justice Brennan, in which he praised the opinion in 
Cooper v. Aaron24 (written by Justice Brennan) by pointing out 
that, in addition to being just and right, it was "not verbose" and 
"gentle in manner, strong in substance." 25 I know that Schlup is 
no Cooper v. Aaron (except to Mr. Schlup), but, in both cases, 
as Judge Arnold would put it, "[t]he maxim, suaviter in modo, 
fortiter in re, comes to mind." 26 
The opinion in Schlup is short, clear, respectful, reasonable, 
modest, and rigorous-all qualities sometimes missing in death-
penalty decisions.27 Judge Arnold did not accuse the en bane 
majority or the panel of bloodthirsty insensitivity nor did he 
suggest that the court had or should have free rein to toss aside 
the Supreme Court's demanding and sometimes deadly 
standards governing post-conviction procedure, even in a case 
that, like Schlup's, presented the real danger of the ultimate 
miscarriage of substantive justice. "[H]uman life [was] at 
stake," 28 and, while not a license for intemperance or 
lawlessness, that fact was enough to warrant the most exacting 
judicial scrutiny the law permits. 
* * * 
24. 358_ U.S. I (1958). 
25. Arnold, supra note 4, at 7. 
26. Id. 
27. See, e.g., Kills on Top v. State, 928 P.2d 182, 213 (Mont. 1996) (Trieweiler, J., 
specially concurring) (" The dissent touches all the politically correct buttons."); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (" Power, not reason, is the new currency of this 
Court's decisionmaking.") (Marshall, J., dissenting); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 
(1994) (Scalia, J ., concurring in denial of petition for writ of certiorari); Id. at 1141 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari). In general, Judge 
Arnold's opinions in death-penalty cases have reflected at the same time his respect for 
juries, lower courts, and state judges and his commitment to providing the full and fair 
review that such serious cases and grave government conduct require. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1995) (systematic exclusion of blacks from jury in capital 
case violated the Equal Protection Clause); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
28. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 755 (Arnold, C. J., dissenting from denial of 
suggestion for rehearing en bane and of motion for stay of execution). 
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The same month Judge Arnold wrote his dissent in Schlup, 
the Minnesota Law Review published its above-mentioned 
tribute.29 I read the various articles to prepare for my interview, 
and they certainly made me want the job. But, looking back-
and I hope the Judge and the distinguished lawyers and judges 
who contributed to the tribute will forgive me-I cannot help 
thinking that the well-meaning tribute failed to do the Judge 
justice. It seems to me today that, rather than identifying, 
explaining, and praising the Judge's talents, the articles aimed 
more at "selling" Judge Arnold to those who presumably were 
advising President Clinton on nominations to the Supreme 
Court. It is almost as if the tribute were designed to smuggle 
Judge Arnold's reasonableness past a gaggle of suspicious 
ideologues and self-appointed guarantors of progressive purity.30 
In my view, though, for what it is worth, it is precisely 
because Judge Arnold's devotion to, for example, the demands 
of the First Amendment is not something that wanes as the 
importance of political litmus tests waxes that he is such a 
principled, respected, and valuable judge, and that it may truly 
be said that he is "Justice Black revived." 31 For instance, to hear 
29. See Brennan, supra note 6. 
30. See Patricia M. Wald, Judge Arnold and Individual Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 35, 
50, 52 (1993) ("Some women's groups have skeptically viewed Arnold's position in 
abortion cases. Except for perhaps one case, I think his record stands up well as a defender 
of a woman's right to control her own body under the strictures of Roe v. Wade . ... Even 
in dissent, orthodox feminists must recognize that his position is in most respects far more 
expansive than the present Supreme Court's. Judge Arnold's critics must play fair among 
all suspects in assessing alleged heresies.") (footnotes omitted). I suppose it could just as 
well be said that in that "one case" -Webster-Judge Arnold demonstrated, by holding 
that a State may write into law, for purposes unrelated to abortion, its commitment to the 
principle that human life begins at conception, the independence from political orthodoxies 
and ideological demands that good judging requires. See Reproductive Health Serv. v. 
Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1085 (8th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Arnold, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
Judge Wald also thought it necessary, apparently, to assure her audience that even a 
judge consigned to the hinterlands of the Eighth Circuit could have the requisite familiarity 
with individual-rights cases. Wald, supra, at 36. Speaking as a big fan of the Eighth Circuit 
and its judges, I cannot help wondering whether the citizenry should be more concerned 
about filling the Supreme Court with judges from Judge Wald's own D.C. Circuit, where 
the docket seems to consist primarily of acronyms suing other acronyms under statutes 
known by acronyms. 
31. Frank & Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 23. It is worth noting, I think, that the 
same is true of Judge Arnold's brother Judge Buzz, also a brilliant and principled judge, on 
"the other side" (to the extent they are on different "sides") of the political spectrum. See 
Frank & Higginbotham, supra, at 22 (noting that Judge Arnold is "the liberals' favorite 
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some of his tribute-bearers tell it, the sole blot on Judge 
Arnold's judicial career is his opinion in United States Jaycees 
v. McClure. 32 In that case, Judge Arnold wrote an opinion 
holding that Minnesota's public-accommodations law, which 
prohibited sex discrimination, was insufficient warrant to permit 
the State to infringe the Jaycees' First Amendment rights of 
association.33 In the Judge's view, "if, in the phrase of Justice 
Holmes, the First Amendment protects 'the thought that we 
hate,' it must also, on occasion, protect the association of which 
we disapprove." 34 
Some have sought to push this opinion aside (as if the 
Supreme Court's 9-0 reversal were not enough on that score!) as 
aberrational or "enigmatic." 35 Judge Wald quipped, "even at his 
peak, Jack Nicklaus had an off-day," 36 and concluded that" [f]or 
recognition of the rights at stake, he gets an A; for balancing, he 
gets a B-." 37 But I believe Judge Arnold deserves praise for his 
constitutional courage in that case, not patronizing 
condescension.38 Presumably, in accord with the today's 
established First Amendment method, he should have engaged 
in a convoluted, multi-factored, utterly contrived "weighing" of 
various elements and "prongs," 39 the results of which would 
be-surprise!-one that accorded with his own beliefs about the 
importance of eradicating sex discrimination. Instead, the Judge 
decided the case as he believed the Constitution required. 
Although Judge Wald gave the opinion a "B-" (and the 
Supreme Court flunked him), I think Justice Black would be 
proud. 
The same could be true, I think, of Judge Arnold's 
interesting dissent in Richenberg v. Perry.40 In that case, the 
conservative and the conservatives' favorite liberal"). 
32. 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984); see Wald, supra note 30. 
33. McClure, 709 F.2d at 1569-78. 
34. Id.at 1561. 
35. Wald, supra note 30, at 53. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 56. 
38. Id. at 35 (" Judge Arnold's progression has been stunning-he surely has many 
more miles to go."). 
39. There's that word again. 
40. 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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majority upheld the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy 
toward homosexuals. The Judge avoided the temptation to dive 
headlong into the controversial moral and political 
underpinnings of that policy-the opinion's measured tone 
reminds me of the Schlup dissent-and instead insisted that the 
failure to permit Captain Richenberg to rebut the presumption 
that, because he is gay, he would necessarily engage in 
prohibited conduct, effectively and unconstitutionally punished 
him for his thoughts, not his actions: "To assume automatically 
that he would [violate the military's policy] is to disadvantage 
him simply for who he is and not for what he has done or will 
do." 41 The Judge reminded us that "[o]ur whole constitutional 
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to 
control men's minds." 42 
This healthy suspicion of attempts by government or 
anyone else to prescribe political orthodoxy,43 and his 
commitment to protecting even the "speech that we hate," 
comes through again and again in his decisions. In Forbes v. The 
Arkansas Educational Television Commission44-another case 
where the Supreme Court parted company with Judge Arnold-
the court held that a state-owned television station could not 
exclude Ralph Forbes, a fringe candidate for Congress who had 
qualified for placement on the ballot, on the purely subjective 
ground that he was not a "viable" candidate. Much to the 
dismay of the latte-and-public-television crowd, the Judge sided 
with Forbes's First Amendment claim, and agreed that a 
government-run news outlet has no constitutional business 
screening out "non-viable" candidates. As the Judge put it, 
" [p ]olitical viability is a tricky concept. We should leave it to 
the voters at the polls, and to the professional judgment of 
41. Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 264. 
42. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)). 
43. In another example, Judge Arnold joined Judge Fagg's majority opinion in Twin 
Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Timmons 
v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), striking down Minnesota's ban on 
"fusion" candidacies, a ban that, he and Judge Fagg believed, served no purpose other than 
advancing the interests of the two dominant political parties and violated the First 
Amendment rights of third-party members. Again, though, it appears from the Supreme 
Court's reversal that the Judge's participation in the case turned out to be the kiss of death. 
44. 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998). 
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nongovernmental journalists. A journalist employed by the 
government is still a government employee." 45 · 
Another example: In United States v. Dinwiddie,46 while 
upholding the "Freedom of Access to Clinics Act" in the face of 
a Lopez-inspired47 Commerce Clause challenge, the Judge 
remained sensitive to the danger that efforts to restrict disorderly 
speech and conduct around abortion clinics pose to First 
Amendment rights.48 Thus, after resolving the Commerce Clause 
question in a straightforward and succinct manner, 49 the Judge 
held that, notwithstanding the occasionally threatening nature of 
Ms. Dinwiddie's pro-life protesting, the district court's "vague 
and overinclusive" injunction violated her First Amendment 
rights.5° For instance, the district court purported to forbid Ms. 
Dinwiddie from airing her view-even to a newspaper 
reporter-that "abortion is a violent, violent business and that 
violence begets violence." 51 Judge Arnold insisted that such 
remarks, however irresponsible, were "pure speech" and that 
the injunction was an "unconstitutional viewpoint-based 
restriction on speech." 52 Other judges have not been so vigilant. 53 
My point here is simply that Judge Arnold's dedication to 
the text and values of the First Amendment has been 
unswerving, even in those cases where a slight deviation might 
have been more pleasing to those who make book on Supreme 
Court nominations. I think it a more fitting tribute to Judge 
Arnold to praise this consistency, which Justice Black shared, 
than to explain it away. 
45. Forbes, 93 F.3d at 504. 
46. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996). 
47. United States v. Lopez, 5_14 U.S. 549 (1995). 
48. Dinwiddie, 76F.3dat917-919. 
49. Id .. at 919-921. Although Judge Arnold's opinion was one of the first decisions by a 
federal court of appeals on the constitutionality of the statute, he resisted the temptation to 
write a Commerce Clause treatise, and instead simply decided the case. 
50. Id. at 927. 
51. Id. at 928. 
52. Id. 
53. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western 
New York, 799 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated 
in part on rehearing en bane sub nom. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. 
Schenck, 67 F.3d 377 (en bane), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
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* * * 
In Judge Arnold's contribution to the Harvard Law 
Review's symposium in honor of the late Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr., the Judge said, "[t]hat clerkship was the best job I 
ever had." 54 Same here, Judge. 
ANNE COHEN* 
It is more than fitting that this inaugural issue of The 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process should include a 
tribute to Richard Sheppard Arnold, Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The reason, however, is 
not simply his widely acknowledged scholarship and even 
wisdom as a federal judge. One of his college classmates and 
fellow circuit judges has said, "Richard is sinart like Learned 
Hand was smart." 
Increasingly, those who shape the law-judges, legislators, 
practitioners of all stripes, trial and appellate judges-are 
compartmentalized and specialized, with mutual distrust and 
disdain common and even encouraged. Richard Arnold, on the 
other hand, continues to live happily in a world of law that is 
broadly defined. In his "big tent" of jurisprudence, the 
participants revel in the critical roles that each set of legal actors 
plays in the development of American law. 
Much of this is attributable, of course, to the fact that he 
has participated in most of the arenas where law is grown-law 
review editor, law clerk, lawyer, political operative (had he 
actually been a politician, he might have won one of those 
elections), legislative and executive aide, trial and appellate 
judge. 
There are few jobs in our legal system that Richard has not 
held; the breadth of his experience and his appreciation of the 
54. Arnold, supra note 4, at 5. 
* Anne Cohen is a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton in New York, New York. She served 
as one of Judge Arnold's law clerks during the 1985-1986 term. 
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different skills these positions require may be as significant to 
his judicial development as his basic smarts. In the same way 
Judge Arnold cherishes the complicated way in which the 
American law is developed and practiced, those of us lucky 
enough to serve as his clerks learned that healthy (but not blind) 
deference to the other components of that system is critical to 
maintenance of the rule of law as well as to success in legal 
playing fields. 
He does not, for example, consider himself the third senator 
from the state of Arkansas (as much as he might have coveted 
the job). A story about Justice Brennan, for whom Judge Arnold 
clerked and who is perhaps the only.non-family member in the 
RSA Pantheon, told us about the difference between legislation 
and common law. Remarking on a draft opinion from another 
set of chambers, Justice Brennan noted that the proposed 
decision should begin not "We hold" but "Be it enacted." 
Similarly, Richard has enormous regard for the other actors 
in the judiciary, and approaches each new matter with the 
expectation that the trial court, counsel, parties, and jury have 
taken their responsibilities seriously. Nevertheless, we also 
learned that judges, lawyers, legislators, and litigants, as human 
beings, are by definition bound to err, and that error, while to be 
avoided, is best confronted by patience and explanation. As 
readers of Arnold opinions may note, only when decisions are 
affirmed is the trial judge identified by name; those reversed are 
just the eastern or western district of some state. (Similarly, 
there is no such thing as a "lower court" in an RSA opinion.) I 
learned the hard way that even Judge Arnold-or at least his 
derks--could goof. Eighteen months after my clerkship ended, 
Judge Waters of the Western District of Arkansas ruled against 
my client based on an Arnold decision that had been written 
during my tenure. Graciously, but with perhaps more 
amusement than necessary, Judge Waters explained that both he 
and then district judge Buzz Arnold considered the decision to 
be erroneous but that he was, of course, bound by the Eighth 
Circuit. (When I sheepishly recounted this episode to RSA, his 
response to the compelling argument against the decision was-
paraphrased-" Whoops.") 
Judge Arnold is testament to the principle (hard to grasp in 
certain Eastern area codes) that there are eleven federal circuit 
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courts of appeal and not just three (Second, District of 
Columbia, and Other), not to mention state appellate courts. A 
clerkship with Richard Arnold implicitly teaches that courts 
west of the Hudson and south of the Potomac have skill and 
authority equal to those anywhere. (Indeed, even D.C. residence 
may not be enough. I cannot adequately describe the look on 
RSA's face when he heard that one of my law school classmates 
withdrew his three remaining Supreme Court clerkship 
applications because, the fellow said, after Justice So-and-so 
picked, all of the" good justices" were taken.) 
So there is something delicious about this great judge and 
this exciting new journal being based in Little Rock. And there 
can be no better valediction for this enterprise that, in helping us 
think about "appellate law and process," it does so in a way that 
does not lose sight-as Richard Arnold never has-of the 
sometimes frustrating and often wonderful contraption that is 
our legal system. 

